Podcast for Inquiry S03E24: Paco Calvo considers the possibility of plant intelligence

Paco’s thesis is a provocative one: plants are, in a meaningful sense, intelligent. Paco discusses what intelligence is, and how we might recognize it in other beings. People used to believe that only humans are intelligent. Over time, other mammals were deemed to also think and feel. Today, most people grant that many animals, such as birds and octopi, exhibit intelligent behaviours. Paco extends this to  plants by detailing what science has to say - both theoretically and empirically - about the hypothesis of plant intelligence. The conversation concludes with some thoughts about the moral and philosophical implications if plants are found to be truly intelligent.

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Podcast for Inquiry S3E20: Does the Bible endorse slavery and genocide? Dr. Joshua Bowen provides receipts.

In his first appearance on Podcast for Inquiry, Dr. Josh Bowen compared what we know about history from archaeology and contemporaneous literature with the stories from the Old Testament. 

In today’s episode, Dr. Bowen reveals what the Bible has to say about slavery and genocide, and goes a bit outside his comfort zone to talk about whether the Old Testament should be considered a guide to a moral and ethical life. 

Referenced during the conversation:

• Read Dr. Bowen’s latest book: Did the Old Testament Endorse Slavery? (Extensively Revised and Expanded Second Edition) 
• Watch Josh rap about Gilgamesh
• Subscribe to Megan Lewis' podcast Misquoting Jesus with Bart Ehrman  

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A video recording is also available: 

Podcast for Inquiry S02E19: “Don’t be Evil” no longer applies, with Paris Marx

Paris Marx (@parismarx) is a critic of Silicon Valley business practices and the impact they have on workers and society at large. Paris writes the Disconnect newsletter and hosts Tech Won’t Save Us, an award-winning critical technology podcast.

In today’s episode, Paris explains the flaws in each category of the tech sector, including:

• Blockchain and crypto currencies - Bitcoin, Ethereum, Dogecoin, Tether
• Asset-light service firms - AirBnB, Uber, Lyft
• Amazon
• Fully digital free services - Google, Facebook / Instagram, Twitter / X

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Podcast for Inquiry Diatribe #2: Catholic Health Care “Ethics”

In this second episode of Leslie’s Diatribes, I sound off on the Health Ethics Guide, a publication of the Catholic Health Alliance of Canada. Employees in Catholic health care facilities in eight provinces are told to sign this code of ethics every year, and many do so without reading it. Leslie highlights some salient aspects of its contents, and encourages those who object to what it demands to refrain from agreeing to it.

The opinions expressed in this episode are mine, and do not represent the Centre for Inquiry Canada or any other organization.

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Podcast for Inquiry S02E01: What It Means to be Moral with Phil Zuckerman

Phil Zuckerman is a professor of Secular Studies at Pitzer College. Phil describes what the Secular Studies program entails from philosophical, political, and sociological perspectives. Phil is the author of What It Means to be Moral, and we discuss how leading an ethical life does not require a religious foundation. Phil is the Executive Director of Humanist Global Charity, and you can read his most recent articles and essays on OnlySky.  

Listen to our conversation here:

A video recording is also available:

Podcast for Inquiry S01E17: Will Artificial Intelligence bolster or destroy humanity? Christopher DiCarlo on the future of AI

Christopher DiCarlo is a philosopher of science and the founder of Critical Thinking Solutions. We start by discussing the potential future for Artificial Intelligence (AI); both to help humanity (through DiCarlo’s Onion Skin Theory of Knowledge (OSTOK) project), and how to avoid a robotic apocalypse. But we quickly realize that the most difficult question is: What would we want a perfectly functioning AI to do? This leads to a fascinating conversation about society, philosophy, and politics, before coming back to AI and our ability to integrate new technology into our mindset, outlook, and culture. 

Listen to our conversation here:

A video recording is also available:

Decretum Symposium summary

Last month I was a panelist at the Cardus Institute's third Decretum Symposium, representing a secular perspective on the practical implications of human dignity. I applaud Cardus for a sincere effort to reach out to others in order to hear different philosophical outlooks. For important topics in society where significant portions of the country disagree on principles and the policies that flow from them, it is essential to have a frank and respectful exchange of ideas. This was my goal with my prepared remarks on human dignity from a secular perspective.

I did not expect to change anyone's core philosophy, in the sense of converting the audience to adopt my worldview. My aim was get attendees - who were all adherents to a religious tradition, primarily Catholic - to think differently, and perhaps to recognize that people on the "other" side (secular folk, atheists, and non-Catholics) also had morals, values, and a philosophy based on a considered ethical foundation. If I was truly successful, they would realize that secularism (government neutrality in matters of religion) is the most reasonable compromise in a pluralistic society.

I had a couple interesting conversations before the event began. (Note that none of what follows is a transcript, though I am recalling what was said and maintaining the fidelity of all arguments to the best of my ability).

The Canadian federal election campaign had recently begun, so politics was a natural topic for conversation. There was a clear preference for the Conservative party in the room. The first person I spoke with told me, "One of my kids said the other day, 'I don't like team Red.' When I asked why, she said, 'Mommy told me they hate us.'" The "us" in his anecdote were observant Catholics. He didn't approve of his wife inculcating political partisanship in the children, though it was apparent he agreed with the sentiment.

Another individual (after introductions and an appropriate amount of small talk) lamented what he saw as an increasing trend toward censorship in today's society. He found there to be a trend of shutting down conversations, with a justification that once a decision has been made, it was time to move on. Surely, he asked rhetorically, we should welcome discussion, including dissenting views?

I inferred that the subtext was MAiD - Medical Assistance in Dying - but since he declined to make the topic explicit, I decided to follow his lead, and instead used a different concrete example to illustrate my thoughts.

I started by agreeing with him. I concurred that we should not censor dissenting views, suppress questions or ban conversation on just about any topic. But I provided two caveats: 1) Time is scarce. As the potential list of things to talk about is infinite, we ought to choose our discussion topics wisely. A person or organization may choose not to discuss something, or to discuss something other than your preferred topic, but that decision is not tantamount to censorship. Flat earthers are not censored, even if geologists won't talk with them or put their items on the agenda of meeting of their professional societies. 2) If a deliberative body has reached a conclusion on a matter, presumably there were valid reasons for coming to the decision. Anyone wanting it to be reconsidered has an obligation to review the arguments and evidence that underpinned the original conclusion. Unless members have new information, reveal a flaw in the decision making methodology, or can point out errors in the original premises, evidence, or reasoning, then there is no reason for an organization to heed some members' calls for a review. Again, as with those proclaiming the earth is flat, in the absence of any evidence of their claims, scientists are right to largely ignore them. They have better things to do with their time.

The Symposium began with a panel of four philosophers and theologians. As I had predicted, each presenter had a different definition of human dignity.

The first speaker, Dr. Moira McQueen of the Canadian Catholic Bioethics Institute, argued that human dignity arises due to each individual's uniqueness. This leads to a perspective of "radical equality, as each person has inherent worth." We should be considered full human beings "from conception to natural death, with no exceptions," and any definition of personhood that begins after conception "is an assault on human dignity." She stated that non-religious people are moral, who value truth and the good - which is a kind of faith, even if not in God. She also claimed that there was "no possibility of a state being neutral" in matters of religion.

Next up was Faisal Bhabha, a law professor at Osgoode. He believes that "what it is to be human is a philosophical and religious question, not a scientific one." There is no straight line between the Enlightenment and the development of human rights, he said, which came to the fore only after World War II. Though dignity is often mentioned in the law, especially Human Rights law, it is nowhere defined. The Supreme Court of Canada has "linked dignity to equality the exclusion of other human rights," which Professor Bhabha laments. Human dignity is a widespread concept, as illustrated by the Arab Spring's rallying cry of, "Bread, Freedom, and Dignity!"

The third panelist was Dr. Douglas Farrow. His address consisted almost entirely of Christian apologetics. It was biblical theism, he stated, that brought the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into being. Dr. Farrow gives Christianity credit for all the good in the world. If a worthy idea was in a Psalm, then it clearly inspired all implementations of that notion.

The final contributor to the first panel was Dr. Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli. He said he was surprised to be representing the secular perspective, because he's usually an apologist for religious authority. He is a moral constructivist, which follows from the writings of John Rawls. He spoke at length about Immanuel Kant's ideas about the categorical imperative. He argued that because humans have reason, we act contra-causally (that is, we have free will). He claimed that in liberal circles, only a philosophical account matters when justifying moral or ethical propositions; religious arguments are discounted, or must be translated. He seemed saddened by this state of affairs, though it's not clear to me why, and he did not elaborate.

My presentation was immediately after dinner. Between performing in innumerable plays and debates during my high school and university years, as well as more recent conference and debate appearances, I have some experience in reading an audience to gauge how my words are being received. However, during my speech I could get no sense of the mood of the room. There were still some people finishing their dessert or concluding their conversations from dinner when I began; within thirty seconds, however, I had everyone's full attention, which I kept for the duration of my speech. Whether it was because I was a compelling speaker that maintained everyone's rapt attention, or people were shocked into silence due to the heresies I was seriously proposing, I could not tell.

My counterpart for the second panel was Dr. Lucas Vivas of the Canadian Federation of Catholic Physicians and Societies. He started by asking, "Why should we care for others, beyond family, loved ones, and for economic benefit?" His answer was human dignity and an ethic of care. Of dignity, he said, "I know what it is - but I don't really know what it is." Doctors tend to define dignity by its absence. For Dr. Vivas, human dignity is inextricably merged with God: if He doesn't exist, there is no such thing as dignity.

Dr. Vivas attempted to refute my contention that "Human dignity demands that we be pro-choice." He argued that autonomy is the equivalent to rationality, so if human dignity is grounded in autonomy, it would be permissible to kill babies. He continued, "Rape is an affront. But carrying life is a blessing, while killing a baby is not. Being pro-life is not an affront to a woman's dignity."

After the formal addresses was a discussion among all six panelists, moderated by Dr. Andrew Bennett. As soon as he was given the floor for some brief remarks, Dr. Farrow spent nearly fifteen minutes laying into me. It was the only time at the Symposium when I experienced overt hostility. To start with, he took great umbrage that my address contained

So many - I counted at least a dozen - "should", "must", and "ought" statements. On what basis do you demand so much of others? Your speech had no philosophical grounding - it was anchored in nothing more substantial than clouds!

Though I was asked to focus on practical applications of human dignity (since the mandate of the first panel was to establish its theological and philosophical underpinnings), this was a a fair criticism. He refused to allow me a chance to answer, however, and continued his rant. He "cannot imagine a civilized society not based in gratitude to the Creator," which - though it allowed for other faiths that worship a different Deity - poses an intrinsic conflict with my proposed secular outlook.

At this point I managed to offer a brief  rebuttal: "No. There is no inherent conflict with a secular person coexisting peacefully with those observing any religious tradition. An issue arises only when one party uses force to coerce the other into adhering to their worldview." His retort was, "Your arguments remind me of Michael Ignatieff," - someone I respect greatly as an academic (and considerably less so as a politician), but I didn't get the chance to say so - "whose position I utterly demolish in Chapter One of my book." (He didn't specify which of his publications.)

He asked me directly: "What would happen if I reject your premise of mutual non-antagonism? What if I want your head on a platter?" He claimed to know all about Hobbes' Leviathan and dismissed it with a wave of his hand, asking, "In your proposed worldview, what's to stop me from killing you?" I'm not sure I truly understood what he was driving at - was he implying that the only reason he didn't decapitate me was his faith in God and fear of His disapproval? I tried to explain that there were laws and norms against such an action, on top of which I would attempt to defend myself against such an onslaught, but I was interrupted several times and couldn't get my point across effectively.

Dr. Farrow then linked increasing secularization in society with the observation that things are getting steadily worse. I rejected his premise, saying that overall humanity is making progress, as average lifespans are increasing and levels of violence, with some unfortunate spikes, are generally decreasing. The audience gasped in shock at this claim; it was clear they vehemently disagreed, and Dr. Farrow mocked me for it, saying this was only true if one cherry picked the data by ignoring all the wars of the 20th century. When I had the chance to speak again, I mentioned that my argument is documented in Steven Pinker's "Better Angels of our Nature", but unfortunately by that point it was too late to be an effective bolster.

Most interesting for me was the audience Q&A session. One attendee was struggling with Dr. McQueen's statement that human dignity is inherent, not something that is given or needs to be earned. "You are claiming," he said, "that humans do not have dignity because we are made in God's image, because that is in reference to God. If dignity is inherent, then God is simply an overlay, and He is not necessary for human dignity!" I realized I was leaning forward in my seat at this point - though the question was not directed at me, I was intensely interested in how he resolved his cognitive dissonance. In the end, motivated thinking won out - he had to reject the notion that human dignity is inherent because he could not accept that an important concept in how we relate to each other did not have God at its centre.

Dr. Bennett directed a question to me. "If we acknowledge that we should respect people's wish to die, does it made sense to spend money on suicide prevention? For these days we are investing millions of dollars to fight an epidemic of suicides among native communities in Canada."

I responded as follows:

There are two parts to this. First, there is a qualitative difference between suicide and assisted death. The first is an over-reaction; a transitory, passionate response to a temporary state of affairs, which the individual lacks the perspective to realize at that moment. We know this to be true because of the many people who have attempted suicide and are subsequently glad that they were unsuccessful. Assisted death, at least in Canada, is restricted to those that have a permanent, degenerative, and fatal condition for which there is no effective treatment or cure, and even then only after significant consultation and evaluation by medical and psychological experts. 

Second, and more importantly, before we start creating rationales to halt suicide prevention programs on reserves, we have an obligation to give first nation communities the same opportunities that other Canadians living in urban and rural areas have. We could start by ensuring that all First Nations have safe drinking water, as some have had boil water advisories for decades. We should increase the amount spent on education and child welfare to match what other Canadians receive. And we need to eliminate the bias in our policing and judicial systems that has discriminated against aboriginals since the first Europeans set foot in North America. If we do that, it is entirely possible that there would no suicide epidemic among First Nations communities to contend with.

A little later, Dr. Bennett directed a second question toward me. He led with a quotation, "He who drools has just as much dignity as he who does not." (I do not recall the source.) He proceeded by querying whether our shared commitment to human dignity (though defined differently by each of us) precluded us from actively terminating a person's life. I decided that there had been enough talk about broad principles and abstract ideas, so I hoped that a personal anecdote might demonstrate the point more poignantly:

A dear friend contracted ALS several years ago. She did not speak of human dignity explicitly, but what gave her life meaning was her interactions with others. The nightmare scenario, for her, was to be trapped in a body with full awareness but be completely unable to communicate. Medical technology could have kept her alive with a feeding tube and a ventilator.

How can anyone claim it is ethical to put her through years or decades of what would be, for her, the worst torture she could imagine? If the key objection is taking active steps to end her life, can one genuinely argue it would be better to let her drown in her own saliva or suffocate because her body no longer could bring sufficient oxygen to her lungs? A decision to end one's life, and to assist someone to do so, should not be undertaken lightly - but I cannot agree that the moral thing to do would be to prolong her life, against her wishes, condemning her to a personal hell, indefinitely.

The conference ended on a positive note, from my perspective. Dr. Vivas had lamented during his speech that he did not practice in a Catholic hospital (and that many such hospitals are Catholic in name only). Further, the Ontario Medical Association is "prosecutorial" towards faith having any role in his medical practice - that is, while he is allowed to be a Catholic who practiced medicine, he risked official censure if he practiced Catholic medicine. In his final remarks to the conference, he explained that in Brampton his patients are overwhelmingly Sikh and Muslim. If his hospital reflected the local demographics, he would be a doctor in a Sikh or Islamic environment, a prospect that made him "distinctly uncomfortable". Perhaps, he acknowledged, "there is some merit in a secular approach," which allowed everyone, regardless of their personal faith, to focus on health.

Overall, I was pleased that I was able to contribute to the public discourse on the role of faith and secular ethics in a pluralistic society.

A secular perspective on human dignity

On Thursday, September 26, I took part in the third Decretum Symposium, an event organized by the Cardus Institute, a faith-based think tank. I was invited by Andrew Bennett, a director at Cardus, whom I met in May while testifying about hate speech before the House of Commons Justice and Human Rights committee. 

The Symposium was about human dignity: what it is, and how it can be applied to the topics of assisted death, abortion, and conscience rights/freedom of religion. I was asked to present a secular perspective on these issues, representing the Canadian Secular Alliance. 

I knew little about my audience save that they would be predominantly practicing Christians, though there would be representatives of other faiths present as well. I will publish my thoughts about the Symposium in a few days.

Here are my prepared remarks:

Good evening. My name is Leslie Rosenblood, and I am a secular humanist. I have chosen this philosophical outlook because it most closely aligns with the principles, morals, and values I hold dear.

Human life is precious. It is precious not because of a deity, nor because of the words written on a sacred scroll centuries or millennia ago. Life is precious because it is rare. As far as we know, there was no life anywhere for the universe’s first 10 billion years, and humanity’s ancestors evolved only a few million years ago. Though we are fortunate enough to be living in Canada today, we can still glimpse just a tiny fraction of the vastness of the universe, and even then only for a minuscule sliver of its existence - on average, for a little over 80 years. The billions of years that will follow us will be known, if at all, only by our descendants. That is why human life is precious, has meaning, and is of value. This life is the one chance we have to experience and understand the world we were born into. It is precisely because there are no second chances, no guiding hand of Fate, and no divine safety net, that our decisions and actions matter. It is only us who are responsible for how we treat each other. It is precisely because I do not believe in an afterlife that I place such value on this one. This, for me, is the source of human dignity.

I have struggled over the past few weeks with the definition of human dignity. It has not been difficult because I don't think it exists. The challenge is that I have not been able to find a definition of human dignity that I believe will be shared by all present tonight. When we speak of human dignity this evening, we should do so with the caveat that we are not likely to have a common understanding of what the phrase entails.

When I speak of human dignity, I do so through the lens of the following two principles:

1. Human autonomy
2. Amelioration of suffering

A genuine commitment to individual autonomy means recognizing that people have different priorities, and will choose different things in similar circumstances. We must be humble enough to acknowledge we do not know what is best for others. Thus I do not think there exists a one-size fits all, simple rule that applies to everyone in all circumstances.

Reducing suffering is essentially an extension of the Golden Rule - suffering is defined as pain and distress, and by asking others to reduce my anguish, I have an obligation to reciprocate.

Neither of these rules is absolute. A prohibition on killing others is a justifiable restriction of untrammeled individual autonomy because it infringes both precepts of human dignity – it is the ultimate violation of another person, and adds greatly to the suffering of the victims and their loved ones. Yet even here, our proscription is not absolute – we allow for an exception when one kills in self-defence.

In addition to avoiding universal or binary rules, we should also agree to a philosophical commitment to truth. We need to examine not only if an idea makes sense in principle, but also be willing to honestly evaluate its real world effects when implemented, and adjust our thinking accordingly. Because while in theory, theory and practice are the same, in practice, they are not.

With this groundwork laid, we can apply these ideas to the specific topics in tonight's discussion.

It is clear that a forcing a woman to carry a fetus to term against her will is a violation of her autonomy. Doing so in cases of rape is cruel, adding to instead of reducing her suffering. When this topic arises, some argue that terminating a set of rapidly dividing largely undifferentiated cells is the moral and legal equivalent to slaughtering an adult human being. This contention contradicts the knowledge about human embryology and development we have accumulated over the past few centuries, and contravenes our commitment to truth and avoiding false dichotomies. Human dignity demands that we be pro-choice.

Nonetheless, I support measures that have the effect of reducing the number of abortions within society. If that is your goal, there is much we can agree on. Fortunately, we have data spanning decades from many countries and we know several things society can do to significantly reduce the number of women seeking an abortion, even where they are readily available:

1. Comprehensive, age-appropriate sex education. When people understand how their bodies work, they make more informed decisions about what to do with them. We know that abstinence-only curricula are positively correlated with teenage pregnancy rates. Accurate information drives down unintended pregnancies, which in turn reduces the number of abortions. 
2. Ready access to birth control and contraception, such as condoms and the pill. Humans are sexual beings, and tend to have intercourse no matter the parental or societal taboos surrounding it. We need to accept this about our nature, and permit the act without the often undesired consequence of a pregnancy. 
3. Increase support for parents of infants and toddlers. There is a clear inverse relationship between structural societal support for babies - such as paid parental leaves and affordable child care - and the number of abortions. When having a child does not threaten a lifetime of poverty, more people choose to become pregnant, and fewer decide not to carry the fetus to term. 

We also know that restricting or banning abortion does little to reduce its prevalence. Introducing education, contraception, and societal supports dramatically lowers the abortion rate. I put it to you that we can agree on public policy goals, even if we arrive at our conclusions starting from different premises.

Assisted death is a complex subject. If we are to consider voluntary euthanasia, we must build in protections against errors and abuse. A temporary condition, such as some forms of pain, should not lead to an irrevocable decision. When people approach the end of their life, they are often robbed of the ability to make informed decisions - and next of kin, regrettably, sometimes prioritize their own interests over the ailing person's. And medical professionals, being human, sometimes make errors in judgement - so we need to independently double check every decision to ensure no mistakes have been made.

Given the extensive efforts required to even consider assisted death, perhaps we should reject it outright. But once one sees what transpires so often in our medical centres today - excruciating pain; dementia; seizures; involuntary expulsion of bodily fluids from every orifice; with many of these cases being untreatable and/or incurable – one cannot conclude that it is moral to prolong their agony for as long as technologically feasible. Human dignity demands otherwise.

I therefore reject both extreme views - that we should take active steps to end a person's life at the smallest inconvenience, and that we should always take all measures to extend every life to the maximum possible extent. Our commitment to autonomy and minimization of suffering means that we must respect a person's desire to die, under appropriately constrained conditions.

A respect for autonomy also informs freedom of conscience. As a secularist - meaning I believe government should neither support nor suppress religious expression - I believe in both freedom of religion and freedom from it.

Let us consider seriously the premise that conscience rights imply one may refuse to perform an aspect of their job that violates their faith. In such a world, the simple act of ordering a bacon cheeseburger at a restaurant may be fraught with difficulties. A Hindu waitress could refuse to serve the burger. A Muslim chef would possibly refuse to cook the bacon. A Jewish employee might forbid the mixing of dairy and meat. And if the customer nonetheless persevered and ate one, a Jehovah's Witness physician would perhaps refuse to perform a lifesaving blood transfusion after the heart attack that followed.

This may seem a trivial thought experiment, but its lessons apply broadly. Let's imagine an employee of the Canada Revenue Agency holds the sincere belief that religion is the root of evil in society today. A church, temple, or mosque applies to have its new house of worship recognized by the CRA as a charitable organization, in full accordance with Canadian law. Should this employee be able to veto the application if it crosses his desk?

I would argue no. This CRA employee cannot claim his personal beliefs override the rights of others to services (or, in this case, tax credits) to which they are legally entitled. By the same token, a sincere belief that homosexuality is a sin does not mean that a justice of the peace may refuse to conduct a marriage ceremony for a same sex couple. Nor, for that matter, should a doctor be permitted to deny an effective referral to a patient that is seeking an assisted death. Religious freedom, and freedom of conscience, cannot be used as a cudgel to enforce one's personal or religious preferences upon others.

Laws must be generally applicable, and apply equally to people of all faiths, as well as those that have none. I want there to be Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, atheists, Hindus, Mormons, Wiccans and more represented in our various municipal, provincial, and federal legislatures and in our civil service. Laws and public policy must not be dictated by any of these faiths. The beliefs of an individual employee should have no effect on the governmental services one receives.  

A secular society allows for the greatest religious freedom for all citizens, subject to reasonable limits in a free and democratic society; it does not include a protected right to coerce others to behave according to the tenets of a particular faith. Recognizing that human dignity consists of individual autonomy and reduction of suffering leads to a society with greater freedom and diversity, thus creating the conditions for human flourishing. I hope that everyone here tonight shares with me that objective. 

Thank you.

Canada is repealing its blasphemy law

I wrote a short article for the June 2018 edition of Critical Links, the newsletter of the Centre for Inquiry Canada. Enjoy.

Canada is repealing its blasphemy law

Governments sometimes pass laws that violate their country's constitution. One purpose of an independent judiciary is to identify and strike down such laws when they are challenged. Since Canada adopted the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, many previously valid laws have been found to be contrary to Canada's constitution. When the courts strike down a law, it has no longer has any legal force, but it remains on the books until such time as Parliament formally repeals it. Thus "zombie laws" accumulate in Canada's Criminal Code until a "cleanup" bill removes them.

In 2016, an Alberta judge, in his decision to convict a man of murder, "relied on section 230 of the Criminal Code, which was declared unconstitutional in 1990 case R. v. Martineau." This embarrassed the federal government, and in response Justice Minister Judy Wilson-Raybould released a statement she had instructed "officials in the Department of Justice to conduct a review of Criminal Code provisions found to be unconstitutional, with a view to updating the Criminal Code to reflect these decisions."

A broad mandate from the Justice Minister to update the Criminal Code presented a rare opportunity to make the case that section 296, Blasphemous Libel, should be removed as part of this modernization effort. Members of three prominent Canadian organizations dedicated to freedom of speech and conscience - Centre for Inquiry Canada, Canadian Secular Alliance, and Humanist Canada - took the opportunity to meet with the senior bureaucrats leading this review in December 2016.

We highlighted several reasons why Section 296 should be repealed. In short, we argued:

• Canada's Blasphemous Libel law, while not tested by the courts, would almost certainly be found to be unconstitutional. 
• Blasphemy laws are an indefensible infringement on freedom of speech in a modern democratic nation. 
• The law is demonstrably obsolete. It was last invoked in 1980 in an attempt to prevent a cinema from showing Monty Python's "Life of Brian", and the last conviction was over eight decades ago. 
• Authoritarian states use Canada's Section 296 as moral cover to defend their own blasphemy laws. 
• Human rights activists around the world have called for Canada to repeal its blasphemy law to strengthen their campaigns for freedom of speech in their own countries. 

(The Canadian Secular Alliance has a brief policy position on blasphemy that makes a compelling case for its repeal.)

On June 6, 2017, the government introduced bill C-51, an omnibus bill that repeals 39 sections and subsections of the Criminal Code (including blasphemous libel), as well as modifying several sections pertaining to admissibility of evidence in sexual assault cases. In November 2017, Greg Oliver, President of the Canadian Secular Alliance, testified before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights to affirm support for repealing Section 296.

Bill C-51 has passed all three readings in the House of Commons, and is currently (as of the end of May 2018) in committee with the Senate, having passed the first two readings there. Based on the speeches made at the second reading in the Senate, repealing Canada's blasphemous libel law is not contentious. Careful attention is being paid to updating evidence admissibility in sexual assault cases, which is entirely appropriate.

Though it cannot be known for certain whether blasphemous libel would have been included in bill C-51 without the intervention of Canada's foremost freethought organizations, I am confident that the meeting with Justice Department officials raised the profile of section 296 while they were crafting this legislation.

Though one cannot predict when a bill in committee will be presented to the Senate for a third reading, there is no reason to expect that bill C-51 will not become law in due course. When it receives royal assent, blasphemous libel will no longer be a crime in Canada.

Chill, but do not yet uncork, your favourite bottle of Champagne.

The Canadian Secular Alliance heads to the Supreme Court of Canada

Later this week the Supreme Court of Canada will hear a case about whether the law societies of Ontario and British Columbia can prevent graduates of Trinity Western University's proposed law school from practicing law in their provinces.

It is no surprise that this case has generated considerable interest and publicity as it has wound its way through three provincial court systems, given the issues at hand:

• The rights and responsibilities of public vs. private educational institutions
• The collision of two fundamental Charter rights: freedom of religion vs. freedom from discrimination
• Institutional autonomy vs. institutional overreach
• Personal freedom of choice vs. communal adherence to religious standards

In addition to the primary parties of Trinity Western University and the Law Societies of Upper Canada (Ontario) and British Columbia, there are 19 interveners, ranging from religious groups (Christian Legal Fellowship, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, World Sikh Organization of Canada, among others), legal institutions (Lawyer's Right Watch Canada, International Coalition of Professors of Law, Canadian Bar Association, among others), minority rights activists (BC LGBTQ Coalition, Egale Canada Human Rights Trust, West Coast Women's Legal Education and Action Fund), and secular humanist organizations (British Columbia Humanist Association, Canadian Secular Alliance). 

As a member of the Canadian Secular Alliance, I will have the honour to witness the proceedings in Ottawa at the Supreme Court on November 30 and December 1. The last time the CSA was an intervener at the Supreme Court of Canada, we won a resounding victory when the judgement declared that opening municipal council meetings with a prayer was a violation of Canada's secular principles. I am less optimistic that secular principles will win the day this time.

Primarily, I'm not sure which issues the Justices will consider central to the case. At its core, this case is about whether provincial law societies are permitted to deny recognition to graduates of a law school duly accredited by the provincial government. Other issues, including Trinity Western University's Covenant, religious freedom, and homophobia, are tangential - yet are the focus of most of the Factums from the nineteen interveners.

Ontario's Court of Appeal did not address Charter issues of freedom of religion or protection from discrimination (please read my analysis of that decision). In ruling in favour of the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC), the Court of Appeal examined the process LSUC followed to come to its decision, and having found it fair, let the decision stand. The Court of Appeal in British Columbia and Nova Scotia considered religious freedom germane, and both ruled in favour of Trinity Western University.

I find it unlikely that the Supreme Court would agree to hear this case only to limit its ruling to procedural affairs; therefore I expect the Court to rule more broadly on at least one of the other issues related to this case.

Perhaps the Justices will focus on institutional autonomy, determining that organizations have considerable freedom to restrict the activities of its (voluntary) membership. By this reasoning, the Court might decide that TWU can claim the right to enforce the terms of its Covenant, and similarly law societies can determine who they admit to the Bar in their province. This has the merit of internal consistency, though I suspect few would be happy with such a ruling because it a) sidesteps the most controversial aspects of the case, and b) sets a precedent whereby organizations are able, under certain conditions, to explicitly discriminate against target groups.

Public universities are immune to Charter challenges in order to protect freedom of inquiry; it's not clear to me whether this also applies to private universities such as TWU. If so, many of the arguments from those opposing TWU (which rest on the explicitly discriminatory nature of the mandatory Covenant) may be moot.

The Court may stray from general principles and rule on the specifics of the case. The Covenant, for example, bars sexual activity between unmarried couples (and between same sex couples regardless of marital status) both on campus and off. It is possible the Supreme Court could rule that restricting legal activities between consenting adults in a private residence off campus is an unjustifiable extension of institutional authority, but I have a hard time connecting such a finding to whether law societies across Canada are obligated to recognize graduates from provincially accredited law schools.

The Canadian Secular Alliance will argue, in part, that freedom of religion is not a relevant argument to defend TWU's Covenant. There is nothing in Christian dogma, scripture, theology, or tradition that mandates the teaching of law in an environment in keeping with Christian morality. One's religious freedom is not infringed if a fellow student chooses to engage in Biblically condemned activities.

And while I agree with this argument (and others) from the CSA, I am concerned about its relevance. The Supreme Court has been (wisely) hesitant to wade into what is and is not required by any religious tradition. The case is about the unprecedented decision by some provincial law societies not to recognize graduates of an accredited Canadian law school.

I can see two arguments that could persuade the Supreme Court to rule in favour of Trinity Western.

1. It is not for law societies to determine which law schools have a set of policies that are deemed to be socially acceptable. This is the responsibility of the provincial government, which in this case has accredited Trinity Western University's law school through the BC Ministry of Advanced Education. While the university in question may have questionable or objectionable policies, any large institution will have taken a position on controversial topics about which reasonable people may vehemently disagree. To rule in favour of the Law Societies of Upper Canada and British Columbia would permit any organization to deny privileges to those coming from institutions with any policy that a reasonable person might find objectionable. This would lead to an untenable situation; thus the Court rules for TWU.
2. Regardless of the merits of criticism of TWU's Covenant (or other policies and practices), it is not the law students and graduates who created it and therefore should not be the ones who bear the brunt of protest. The retaliatory measures taken by provincial law societies is a form of collective punishment against those who bear no moral nor legal responsibility for a potentially odious policy, and therefore the decision of Ontario and BC not to recognize TWU law graduates is deemed unconstitutional.

Neither of these arguments rest on religious freedom. A decision that determined that the institution of TWU had religious rights that trumped the rights of individual students would be extremely worrying. Fortunately, this would be a significant change of direction for the Court to take so I deem it unlikely.

The best decision, in my view, would be one that affirmed personal freedoms and secular principles. TWU can teach law from an evangelical Christian perspective, so long as it continues to meet the (presumably) stringent provincial curriculum requirements. The mandatory nature of the Community Covenant would be found to be an unreasonable infringement on the private life of students, and signing it could no longer be a prerequisite to attend the school. Those from outside the evangelical community, including those of other faiths (and none), would continue to be welcome to both attend the school and espouse their perspective. Gay students would not be forced (nor pressured) to remain chaste during their tenure at TWU.

A decision along these lines is possible, if unlikely.

Nonetheless, I am excited to visit the Supreme Court of Canada for the first time. I look forward to hearing the arguments from the many interveners. And I hope that, when the Court publishes its decision in 2018, it will uphold the secular tradition that has served Canada well.

Ontario Court of Appeal rules that TWU graduates cannot practice law in Ontario

Trinity Western University (TWU) requires all its students to sign a Community Covenant Agreement, which demands (among other things) that sexual relations be restricted to heterosexual married couples. Violators of the Covenant are subject to academic censure, up to and including expulsion. TWU is planning to open a law school in September 2018.

The Law Society of Upper Canada's reaction to this blatantly discriminatory policy, after consulting with its members, was to deny TWU graduates from practising law in Ontario. Last month, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled the Law Society of Upper Canada was within its rights to do so.

While I am pleased with the overall decision, some of its reasoning leaves me discomfited.

First, the good.

The Court states unequivocally (P115) “that TWU’s admission policy, viewed in conjunction with the Community Covenant, discriminates against the LGBTQ community on the basis of sexual orientation contrary to s. 15 of the Charter and s. 6 of the HRC.”

Later on, the Court acknowledges again the harm that TWU's Covenant does (P138): “LSUC’s decision not to accredit TWU does not prevent the practice of a religious belief itself; rather it denies a public benefit because of the impact of that religious belief on others – members of the LGBTQ community.”

The Court looks at the procedure LSUC followed in making its decision (P122-128) and finds that it was fair. Therefore, (P132) “There is nothing wrong with a law society, acting within its jurisdiction, scrutinizing the admission process of a law school in deciding whether to accredit the law school. […] LSUC could take account of the fact that all law schools currently accredited by it provide equal access to all applicants in their admissions processes. An accredited TWU would be an exception.” This is the key paragraph in the ruling that is generally applicable.

Here the judge a) implicitly acknowledges the discriminatory nature of the Covenant against homosexuals, and b) states that law societies are within their rights to take that into account when determining whether to accredit a law school. It is this finding (which is essentially repeated in P135) that I hope sways the justices at the inevitable Supreme Court appeal. 

Other aspects of the ruling I found to be troubling.

The Canadian Secular Alliance was an intervener in the case, and submitted a factum in which the key arguments were:

• The Charter exists to protect people from discrimination. It cannot be used as a justification to discriminate against others.
• This case isn't about studying law in an evangelical Christian environment. It's about enforcing an openly discriminatory policy that violates the Charter rights of students, and claiming protection for this bigotry under the aegis of religious freedom.
• Nothing in Christianity (doctrine, theology, tradition) demands studying law in a Christian environment or strictly from a Christian perspective, so Charter religious freedom protections are not applicable.
• LSUC's decision is not an infringement of religious freedom. No TWU student is forced to alter their beliefs about what constitutes healthy sexuality. No one is being silenced. To claim that the mere presence of a non-celibate homosexual in the same law class as an evangelical Christian is an infringement of their religious practice is unreasonable.

 Regrettably, the Court rejected the first point above and ignored the others.

The Court found that institutions, not just individuals, have Charter rights. Thus the religious rights of TWU (not its students or faculty) must be balanced against potential harms against minority groups. In the words of the Court (P94):

“individuals [...] necessarily require an entity to both establish a community within which members can study law from an evangelical Christian perspective and to set and enforce the religious practices to be followed by the law school community. It is only through TWU that the claim to operate a degree-granting accredited law school from an evangelical Christian perspective can possibly be advanced. In this way, TWU acts as the vehicle through which the religious freedoms of its individual members, including teachers, students, and staff, can be manifested, pursued and achieved.” [emphasis added]

Thus, the Court concludes that TWU’s religious freedom not only exists, but is infringed upon by the LSUC decision (P99). “The question remains, however, whether the LSUC’s decision not to accredit TWU because of the existence of the Covenant would interfere with TWU’s religious freedom in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial. I accept that it would.”

The Court also finds, in P101, that an individual’s “right to freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter” was infringed by LSUC’s decision not to recognize TWU graduates. The judge also mentions “TWU’s religious freedom” in P11 and P114, and implicitly refers to it in others.

In addition to being wrong (in my opinion) in itself, granting religious rights to institutions is a troubling precedent. I am concerned that if this reasoning is upheld by other courts, future Canadian jurisprudence may echo recent American rulings, such as the Hobby Lobby case (certain corporations can restrict the health coverage it provides for its employees if a procedure conflicts with the religious beliefs of its owners). The reasoning can also be used to blur the distinction between institutions and individuals (as the United States has also done, and I worry that Canada may be only a few years behind).

Another concern is that TWU has managed to hoodwink the Court. TWU justifies its existence as an accredited Canadian university based on its openness to all prospective students (subject to the restrictions in the Covenant). But while the Court implicitly recognizes this, it also finds (P91) that “the decision to attend TWU is fundamentally a religious one”. The contradiction between TWU being a proselytizing “community committed to making a positive difference in the world for Christ” that allows one  (P92) “to participate in an education community, consisting largely of like-minded individuals, that embraces values grounded in evangelical Christian beliefs”, and being an open, welcoming culture for all - including atheists and homosexuals, who presumably would have significant issues in such an environment - seems to be lost on the Court.

Ultimately, the Court ruled in favour of the Law Society of Upper Canada for two reasons:

• LSUC was scrupulously fair in the procedure it followed (P122-128) to determine that it would not recognize TWU law graduates. 
• LSUC has a statutory mandate to serve the public interest. TWU has the right of freedom of religion under section 2 a) of the Charter. The LSUC decision strikes a reasonable balance between these competing objectives. P143 is the crux of this argument: 

“Taking account of the extent of the impact on TWU’s freedom of religion and the LSUC’s mandate to act in the public interest, the decision to not accredit TWU represents a reasonable balance between TWU’s 2(a) right under the Charter and the LSUC’s statutory objectives. While TWU may find it more difficult to operate its law school absent accreditation by the LSUC, the LSUC’s decision does not prevent it from doing so. Instead, the decision denies a public benefit, which the LSUC has been entrusted with bestowing, based on concerns that are entirely in line with the LSUC’s pursuit of its statutory objectives.”

I expect TWU's appeal will focus on discrediting the logic and conclusion of this paragraph of the decision.

One key pillar of the decision - the specifics of LSUC's procedural fairness - will not be the legal principle under dispute if the Supreme Court of Canada agrees to hear the appeal (as there are pending decisions for similar cases in British Columbia and Nova Scotia). The other fundamental argument - that the decision is a reasonable balance between competing rights - confers upon religious organizations a status roughly equivalent to the rights enjoyed by religious individuals. I strongly support the latter, but am deeply uncomfortable with the former.

Thus, unlike last year's Supreme Court ruling on prayers to open official municipal proceedings, the Ontario Court of Appeal decision is not the clear upholding of secular principles that one might hope for.

Jerry Coyne, author of Faith vs. Fact, visits Toronto

On June 10, Jerry Coyne (whose website I have enjoyed reading for a few years) came to Toronto to speak about his new book at a Centre for Inquiry sponsored event. I enjoyed his talk and purchased his book (which I'm currently about halfway through).

I was asked by one of the attendees to write a synopsis for Canadian Atheist. Feel free to read my comments on his public address. I am glad I had the opportunity to hear him speak in person.

The next day, he was interviewed by Steve Paikin on The Agenda. It overlaps considerably with what his CFI speech, so below I have included that segment of the show.

Chesterton debate: Full video

Last month I participated in the Chesterton debate. I have previously published my opening remarks (15 minutes) and my responses to Dr. Benson's three questions (five minutes each).

Below is the entire debate, including my questions to Dr. Benson, questions from the audience, and a discussion guided by the moderator, Lorna Dueck.

I've only watched a few minutes so far, and can say that the picture quality is excellent.

I hope you enjoy.

Chesterton Debate: Question three and my answer

Dr. Benson asked a third and final question of me based on my opening remarks in the Chesterton debate. His question is indented below; my answer follows.

Chief Justice Brian Dickson in Big M Drug Mart stated that religious freedom is prototypical - meaning it has led the way to other rights such as freedom of speech, assembly etc..  It would seem then that once we have religious freedom of all including freedom of politicians to live in accordance with his/her religious principles, we have a greater chance of protecting all the other freedoms.  This being the case, as well as the strong evidence (referred to in my opening comments) about various public goods (such as charitable works, volunteerism etc.) being strongly correlated with religious adherence, do you not agree that religion needs to be protected from moves to narrow its public as well as private influences?

Paragraph 123 in Big M:

Religious belief and practice are historically prototypical and, in many ways, paradigmatic of conscientiously‑held beliefs and manifestations and are therefore protected by the Charter . Equally protected, and for the same reasons, are expressions and manifestations of religious non‑belief and refusals to participate in religious practice.

It is my view that freedom of religion and its more general right, freedom of conscience, are essential for a democratic country, as well as the closely related principle of freedom of expression. So in that sense, yes – religion deserves protection. But I do not think that it needs additional, special privileges above and beyond those accorded to all voluntary associations within society. Protecting the freedoms of expression and conscience are sufficient to guarantee religious liberty.

Consider this: religious liberty itself is constrained in countries where citizens do not enjoy full freedom of conscience and expression. The Economist reported in December that 19 countries punish their citizens for apostasy - leaving their religion - and in 12 of those nations it is punishable by death.

55 countries (including several Western democracies) have laws against blasphemy; a conviction could lead to a prison term in 39 nations and execution in six. Blasphemy laws have been abused almost everywhere they are enacted, frequently to suppress religious minorities, persecute political rivals, minority sects, or stifle inconvenient speech. It is important to realize that Canada is not exempt; we too have a blasphemy law, which was last used to censor a Monty Python film, in a failed attempt to prevent its distribution in Canada. I've never understood the rationale for blasphemy laws; surely those who believe in an omnipotent God know He does not need the support of a human law, while those who do not believe in God view blasphemy as the ultimate victimless crime.

Mr. Benson claimed in his opening remarks that "secular is a sort of exclusionary violence to freedom and rights". Yet it is precisely the devout, particularly those who belong to minority faiths, would should be the most committed secularists. The principle of secularism - government neutrality between and among faiths - is the best protection for religious minorities that are persecuted in far too many places in the world. Anyone genuinely concerned about religious liberty, and freedom of conscience, must oppose tonight's resolution, for a secular state is the only one that guarantees full freedom of religious worship and expression. A secular state is not concerned with purported acts heresy or apostasy. No one need smuggle a bible into a secular country; a secular nation has no pogroms.

And let us not forget that those that adhere to no religious tradition are equally deserving of protection - and are often specially targeted for persecution. Even in the United States, with its official separation of Church and State, politics is so infused with religion that atheists are banned from holding public office by the constitution of seven US states. Contrary to Mr. Benson's insinuations, it is not the secular minded folk who lack tolerance.

Regarding religious adherence and various public goods, Professor of sociology Phil Zuckerman asks an intriguing question: "Is a society to be considered moral if its citizens love the Bible a lot (as in the United States), or rather, if its citizens virtually wipe out poverty from their midst (as in Scandinavia)?"

More generally, however, there are very good reasons for keeping God out of politics. As lawyer and philosopher Ron Lindsay put it, "We can't base our laws based on the word of God in part because we don't know what God is saying. The Jewish and Islamic god says you can't eat pork; the Christian god says that's okay. The Islamic god says Friday is a holy day, the Jewish god says Saturday, the Christian god says Sunday. The list of disagreements can go on and on and on. As soon as you introduce religious precepts into a public policy discussion, you are essentially shutting out of that discussion anyone who is not a follower of that religion."

Let us ground our politics in evidence and values accessible to all members of society. We can best protect freedom of religion by keeping it as far from politics as we possibly can.

Chesterton debate: Question two and my answer

The indented text below is Dr. Benson's second question to me based on the text of my opening remarks in the Chesterton debate. My response follows.

As did mid 19th Century secularists you seem to suggest that "evidence based public policy" favours the non-religious viewpoints.   Many things that matter to us in life and government policy are not, however,  susceptible to "evidence" assessments free of moral commitments.   Moral debates about such issues as euthanasia, gender-selection abortion or certain kinds of tax policies are not resolved by "evidence" cut off from competing interests and beliefs.   In short: we choose how to weigh evidence against a moral background based on our beliefs.   Your approach gives atheists and agnostics the ability to have their beliefs effective in relation to moral public policy formation but not religious people's: how can that be fair?

Embedded in this question is a false assumption - that I am proposing we exclude the ability of religious politicians to use their moral judgement. I have never advocated for such a position, nor has any prominent secularist organization. However, all politicians, religious and non-religious alike, have a responsibility to express their goals and concerns in universal values, rather than in the terms of their particular creed. This allows all people, of all backgrounds, of all faiths (including those having none) - to fully participate in the political arena. Mr. Benson asks: How can that be fair? I respond: What could be more fair?

Mr. Benson is correct that I favour evidence based public policy. We both hold the view that while evidence must inform public policy, it cannot dictate it. One key role of elected officials is to determine the extent to which competing interests benefit from a proposed law or policy. There are often trade offs that lie at the heart of a politician's job - such as whether to raise or lower taxes (and which ones), increase or decrease spending (and where), run a surplus or deficit - all in an infinite number of possible combinations. We should use knowledge to foresee, as best we can, the consequences of various options, but ultimately a decision will be made due to priorities that come from a philosophical or moral foundation that is not based on evidence alone.

Religious groups are allowed to have their say in the public square, even if they give explicitly religious rationales for their positions. By the same token, however, politicians and judges are under no obligation to accept arguments whose only justification is religious in nature.

While same sex marriage was being considered in Canada  a decade ago, religious voices were a significant part of the discussion and religious groups were very active in the debate. Canada's legislature, its courts, and society overall did not end up agreeing with the religious perspective – but all interested parties were able to express their moral beliefs about the topic.

More recently, in October, an interesting case was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada about whether it is legal for a municipality in Quebec to start its meetings with a prayer. The Court has yet to render its verdict.

In addition to the plaintiff and the defendant, there were several interveners that presented before the Supreme Court: the Canadian Secular Alliance, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, the Catholic Civil Rights League, the Faith and Freedom Alliance, and the Association of Catholic Parents of Québec. It is simply not the case that "religious beliefs are not permitted in the public sphere." Religious voices are being heard, even if their arguments are sometimes rejected. Religious organizations engage all levels of government, through direct lobbying, raising money, taking out advertisements, voting with their feet, just like any other group. This cannot be accurately described as discrimination.

Mr. Benson: I am here tonight because I am intensely concerned about fairness. To ensure justice and equal participation from all members of society, we need only apply the criteria that you yourself laid out just a few minutes ago - that we judge arguments based on their fairness, reasonableness, and general applicability. If we combine that with the ideas from my opening address - that public policy be based on the principles of human experience, objective evidence, reason, human empathy and compassion - then we have a way to determine which laws, actions, and policies are in the common interest, whether one's altruism is motivated by religious faith or whether the inspiration to public service stems from a humanist philosophy. This is democratic. This is just. This is fair.

Chesterton Debate: My opening remarks

On Friday evening, I debated Dr. Iain Benson on whether "one’s religious convictions should play a significant role in how they conduct themselves in political affairs."

I took the negative side of the resolution, and below is my fifteen minute opening address to make the case for government neutrality in matters of religion.

There is a scene in the 1971 film "Fiddler on the Roof" where the rabbi of a poor, oppressed Jewish village in pre-revolutionary Russia is asked to say few words about the Tsar. He responds, "A blessing for the Tsar? Of course! May God bless and keep the Tsar... far away from us!"

It is natural and appropriate for believers to have freedom OF religion, and it is equally right and just that others should have freedom FROM it. In this way, individuals are free to conduct themselves according to their personal or shared religious (or not) viewpoint.

But tonight's debate is not about private behaviour. This evening we are discussing political affairs: Using the power and influence of one's public position to pressure others to conform to your creed's mores, co-opting governmental institutions to serve sectarian ends, or legislating on the basis of religion. These activities should be rejected.

On the other hand, it would be foolish to suggest that a public avowal of a particular faith would disqualify an individual from an elected or appointed role in public office. I propose that devout Catholics and ardent atheists are both welcome to fully participate in public and political life. On their own time, those with religious convictions can attend the church, synagogue, temple, or mosque of their choice while serving any function in government or politics.

I further propose that Catholics should not be forced to abide by the strictures of (say) Hinduism, and vice-versa. Both should be free to follow their respective faiths. I, as an adherent of neither, would object to being coerced into submitting to the dictates of either. In addition, religious groups generally desire minimal interference from governments in doctrinal affairs. Clearly, then, all of us have a personal interest in opposing tonight's resolution. For once one religion can impose its tenets upon the populace, there is little to stop other faiths from doing the same if they gain political power at a later date. Let us keep any religion - and therefore all religions - at a safe distance from our political institutions.

The Supreme Court of Canada agrees. In 2004, it wrote: "As a general rule, the state refrains from acting in matters relating to religion. It is limited to setting up a social and legal framework in which [...] members of the various denominations are able to associate freely in order to exercise their freedom of worship."

This is a common theme in Canadian jurisprudence. Eight years later, it also wrote: "State neutrality is assured when the state neither favours nor hinders any particular religious belief, that is, when it shows respect for all postures towards religion, including that of having no religious beliefs whatsoever."

I endorse this sentiment, and I think many of you agree with it as well. I hope I can convince the rest of you that this principle is the best means to secure liberty and human flourishing. If I succeed, everyone here tonight should agree that one’s religious convictions should *not* play a significant role in how they conduct themselves in political affairs.

This does not mean we should dismiss any action on the basis that it might be motivated by religious faith. As Barack Obama put it: "We are under obligation in public life to translate our religious values into moral terms that all people can share, including those who are not believers."

On the thousands of issues that politicians must negotiate, the world's major religions are often silent, contradictory, or ambiguous. One's religion should not play a significant role in political affairs because, for the vast majority of political decisions, there is no clear religious course of action. And in those cases where sacred scrolls do detail specific punishments for particular misdeeds, we in Canada often cheerfully disregard them - and this is as it should be. I am confident no one supports the Biblical injunction that would force a woman to marry her rapist. [Deuteronomy 22:28-29] While many here may disapprove of adultery, none present would advocate killing those who cheat on their spouses, as the Bible commands. [Leviticus 20:10]

In other areas, religious and materialist philosophies each incorporate such disparate perspectives that neither can claim to own a side of an issue. Look at climate change. Some religious folk believe God has a plan for humanity and would never allow us to go extinct, so we may as well strip mine the earth. Others with a religious bent see themselves as stewards of Creation and therefore feel a moral obligation to protect the environment. Conversely, those with an entirely materialist viewpoint may believe their financial self-interest lies with the continued development of Canada's tar sands and so vehemently argue against global warming. And many non-religious people view rising sea levels as an existential threat to several island nations, and are therefore impelled to advocate for a strong global carbon emissions cap. One's politics cannot be determined by one's faith, or its absence.

The same can be said of morality. I often hear that religion and ethics are one and the same - indeed, that the source of all morals is religion, or that an ethical life is impossible without the values spelled out in some holy text. Though commonly repeated, it is easy to see this is not the case.

It is undeniable that many deeply religious people commit abominable acts such as covering up child abuse or detonating suicide bombs in public areas.

It is also true, as most of you likely know through personal experience, that most non-believers lead decent lives. I find it interesting that statistically, atheists are significantly under-represented in prisons throughout North America.

The point is one's morality says nothing about the extent of their belief, and one's piety implies nothing about their basic human decency.

And though many with deeply held religious convictions are highly moral, the same cannot always be said of religious institutions. The Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, was sharply critical. On racial segregation and discrimination, the most prominent and important social issue of the time, he wrote: "In deep disappointment I have wept over the laxity of the church."

Perhaps the declining political influence of religious institutions is not a bad thing. University of London professor Stephen Law observed, “if declining levels of religiosity were the main cause of…social ills, we should expect those countries that are now the least religious to have the greatest problems. The reverse is true.” According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, those states in the US with the best quality of life are among the least publicly pious (such as Vermont and New Hampshire). This generalizes globally. Democratic nations where religion plays little role in political affairs, such as Sweden, Norway, Japan, Australia, and the Netherlands, fare much better on just about every sociological indicator of well-being.

All individuals, including those who are active in political affairs, have the right to make their own choices, but not to demand that others do likewise. If you think homosexuality is wrong, don't have intercourse with someone of the same sex. But criminalizing gay relationships or opposing equal marriage is an affront to equality, justice, morality, and human rights. Enforcing one's own religious strictures upon others breeds societal ills.

That is why a politician should set aside religious dictates when acting as a representative of the government to shape public policy.

As a thought experiment, let's examine the consequences if religious beliefs truly dictated the laws of the land.  

A parliament legislating according Catholic doctrine, for example, would ban the sale of condoms to men and the prescriptions for the pill for women. If orthodox Jews were in power, they would outlaw the consumption of all pork and shellfish. Jehovah's Witnesses would make life-saving blood transfusions illegal. A Hindu regime would outlaw eating beef, while a government legislating according to Muslim morality would criminalize the consumption of alcohol. Most of these would forbid working on the Sabbath, though there is some disagreement between them on when the Sabbath starts, and indeed on which day of the week it falls.

Can anyone genuinely argue that life would be better with no birth control, no steak, no lobster, arbitrary restrictions on life-saving medical procedures, a return to the days of Prohibition, or no bacon? (Please, let us at least keep bacon.)

But one need not resort to hypothetical situations. Where religion and politics meet, tragedy and injustice often follow.

In Ireland in October 2012, Savita Halappanavar was pregnant and gravely ill with a serious infection. Doctors refused her request for a medically justified abortion because of a religiously motivated law that forbade removing even a miscarried foetus, no matter the risk to the mother's life. As a result, both mother and foetus died. This egregious violation of a woman's basic human rights, and other recent examples, are the direct result of religion's influence in politics.

In a secular democracy no Church can dictate legal, social, or educational policy - and in return government does seek to control the practice of religion, so long as those practices do not interfere with the rights of others. As my father often said, "My right to swing my fist stops at the bridge of your nose."

The principle of equality is evident when there is one law for all. Injustice inevitably follows when the laws of the land are subject to a theological veto, or when they apply one set of rules to the religious (or to those of a particular sect), and another for everyone else.

Mohandas Gandhi rejected the principle of tonight's resolution. He said, "If I were a dictator, religion and state would be separate. I swear by my religion. I will die for it. But it is my personal affair. The state has nothing to do with it. The state would look after your secular welfare, health, communications, foreign relations, currency and so on, but not your or my religion. That is everybody's personal concern."

To maximize freedom for all, let us not inject politics into religion. Who here tonight wants the government to be ever more involved with the Church? Does anyone want legislators or judges, whose expertise typically resides outside of ecclesiastical matters, to be the final arbiter on difficult religious and theological questions? I certainly do not. Do you?

To maximize freedom for all, let us not inject religion into politics. Because most of us have chosen at some point to use condoms or go on the pill; because chances are someone you know is better off because they obtained a divorce from an abusive spouse and are now happily remarried; because there are those who have access to medical benefits from their same-sex partners; because Professor Benson and I are able to publicly debate the role of religion in the political realm with neither of us fearing any social or legal reprisals; for all these reasons, let us all breathe a sigh of relief we do not live in a country run on the basis of religious dogma, where any of these might not be possible or could lead to incarceration. Instead, let us be thankful that our laws and government are largely based on secular principles of human experience, objective evidence, reason, and human empathy and compassion.

Therefore join with me this evening. Maximize everyone's freedom and social well being - Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, Wiccan, and non-religious citizens alike. Advocate for our collective human interest instead of for narrow sectarian preferences. Ensure responsible government and demand evidence-based public policy.

Finally, there is a word to describe when religion dominates politics: theocracy. I would like to give the last word to Professor Benson. From his 2013 article: "Theocracy seems to corrupt religious proposition by using the instruments of coercion that are essential to law in service of religions." I agree wholeheartedly - and therefore urge you, as well, to prevent the corruption of religious faith by rejecting the proposition that one's religious convictions should play a significant role in how they conduct themselves in political affairs.

Thank you.